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In a two-player stag hunt with asymmetric information, players may lock each other 
into requiring a large number of confirmations and confirmations of confirmations 
from one another before eventually acting. This intuition has been formalized in the 
electronic mail game (EMG). The literature provides extensions on the EMG that 
eliminate inefficient equilibria, suggesting that no formal rules are needed to prevent 
players from playing inefficiently. The present paper investigates whether these 
results extend to the multi-player EMG. We show that standard equilibrium 
refinements cannot eliminate inefficient equilibria. While two players are predicted to 
play efficiently, many players need formal rules telling them when who talks to 
whom. 
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E-mail has made it cheaper and faster to communicate within firms. Taking the stance from 
the organization literature that a firm can be seen as being involved in coordination problems 
(for a recent overview, see Calvó-Armengol and de Marti, 2009), it seems at first sight that 
increased  communication  through  e-mail  would  make  it  easier  for  firms  to  solve  their 
coordination problems. Hand in hand with the arrival of these technologies, sociologists have 
argued in favor of a new view on firms, which rather than as hierarchies should be seen as 
non-hierarchical  networks  of  employees  (e.g.  Powell,  1990).  Yet,  in  contradiction  to  this 
intuition, some firms have introduced measures that limit internal e-mail exchanges, such as 
e-mail-free Fridays (Washington Post, 2007). While other explanations may contribute to this 
phenomenon, we show in this paper that one rationale for this phenomenon is that allowing 
employees  to  freely  communicate  may  decrease  rather  than  increase  the  probability  of 
coordination. 
Marschak (1955) and Radner (1962) have induced a large literature that treats the problem 
of  organization  as  a  problem  of  aggregating  information  that  is  dispersed  over  many 
individuals (see Calvó-Armengol and de Marti, 2009). The question arising in this literature 
is:  what  communication  network  optimally  aggregates  this  dispersed  information?  In  this 
paper, we take a somewhat different approach, and see firms as being involved in repeated 
collective-action problems, where in each collective-action problem, one employee or player 
is informed about the opportunity to benefit from collective action. Collective action is only 
successful if the informed player is able to rally a sufficient number of other players; for 
simplicity, we assume this to be all the players in the game. Such a game has an “I’ll go if a 
sufficient number of other players go” feature: as long as a sufficient number of other players 
act, the individual player acts.
1 Thus collective action is a possible equilibrium outcome. Yet, 
at  the  same  time,  acting  with  an  insufficient  number  of  players  is  risky.  Before  players 
actually act, they will not only want to know whether there is an opportunity for collective 
action, but also – if there is even a small probability that information does not get through – 
they will want to know whether everyone else knows about this opportunity. Furthermore, 
they will want to know whether everyone knows that everyone knows it; and so on. It thus 
seems that players may engage in such an extensive amount of checking and double-checking 
each other’s knowledge that they never actually come to act.
2 Thus, if when we talk about a 
communication  network  in  this  paper,  contrary  to  what  is  the  case  in  the  organization 
literature, we refer to the exchange of messages, confirmations of messages, etc. between 
players. 
The fear of excessive communication is confirmed by Rubinstein (1989) in his electronic 
mail game (henceforth EMG), which in its standard form is a two-player game where an 
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1 In sociology, such models of collective action are known as threshold models (see Granovetter, 1978), where 
an agent’s threshold refers to the number of other agents who need to participate in the collective action for 
benefits to arise for the agent. See Chwe (2000) for a formal model of such threshold models. In these models, 
players’ thresholds may differ. In the current paper, we take the simplifying assumption that all players share the 
same threshold, and that this threshold is equal to the number of players in the game.   
2 In general, there are two mechanisms by which players attempt to reduce the risk of acting alone, as listed by 
Chwe (1995), namely reconfirmation and redundancy. In Chwe’s work, however, redundancy means that an 
identical message is sent several times, whereas in the current paper, it means that players are on multiple chains 
on which players are ordered in a different way, where these chains form multiple alternative channels along 
which information can travel.   2 
informed player knows whether or not a stag hunt
3 is played; if a stag hunt is played, there are 
benefits in cooperating. If the underlying game is a stag hunt, Rubinstein assumes that an 
automatic communication protocol sends a message to the uninformed player. If this message 
gets through, which happens with large probability, the automatic communication protocol 
sends a proof of receipt from the uninformed to the informed player. It this proof of receipt 
arrives, the protocol sends a proof of receipt of the proof of receipt from the informed to the 
uninformed player – and so on until a message gets lost. Rubinstein shows that the only 
equilibrium for this game is one where no player ever acts. 
More  recently,  some  authors  have  extended  the  two-player  EMG  to  come  to  equilibria 
where  cooperation  still  takes  place.  Binmore  and  Samuelson  (2001)  assume  that 
communication is voluntary. Players both decide on how many proofs of receipt to send, and 
on how many proofs of receipt to pay attention to. Furthermore, players incur more costs the 
more proofs of receipt they send and pay attention to. These costs put a cap on how many 
messages to sent back and forth. Moreover, the fact that communication is voluntary ensures 
the existence of efficient equilibria where at most the uninformed player sends a proof of 
receipt to the informed player. Nevertheless, players’ mutual expectations may still lock them 
into equilibria where a large number of proofs of receipt, and proofs of proofs of receipt are 
required.  Thus,  Binmore  and  Samuelson’s  analysis  continues  to  give  credence  to 
Geanakoplos’  (1992)  lesson,  taken  from  the  two-player  EMG:  it  justifies  strict  rules  of 
communication, such as a military rule between fighter pilots to only confirm each message 
once, and not confirm the confirmation.  
De  Jaegher  (2008a)  extends  Binmore  and  Samuelson’s  paper  by  assuming  that  the 
individual player is able to falsely pretend having received a message. While Nash equilibria 
where players send a large number of messages back and forth continue to exist under such 
modified assumptions, efficient equilibria either are not sequential equilibria or do not meet 
the intuitive criterion. Long exchanges of confirmations are not sequentially rational because 
a player who is planning not to act should not send any costly messages. Suppose that a player 
does not receive a message, but still pretends to have received it (= false acknowledgement). 
At worst, when detected, the other player will punish such a false acknowledgement by not 
replying to it and not acting. But the cheating player who receives a confirmation of his false 
acknowledgement then knows that his cheating was not detected. Moreover, applying the 
intuitive criterion, consider a Nash equilibrium where the informed player sends a message to 
the uninformed player, who then sends a confirmation, after which the informed player sends 
a confirmation of this confirmation. Three messages then need to arrive for collective action 
to take place. The uninformed player does not run any risk from acting, whereas the informed 
player is not completely sure whether his or her last message reached the uninformed player. 
Both  players  are  better  off  if  the  informed  player  simply  sends  a  single  message  to  the 
uninformed  player.  By  the  intuitive  criterion,  if  the  informed  player  deviates  from  the 
inefficient described equilibrium by staying quiet at the first stage and sending a message at 
the  third  stage,  the  uninformed  player,  who  then  appears  to  receive  a  confirmation  of  a 
message that he or she never sent, should realize that the informed player is trying to move to 
a more efficient equilibrium. Intuitively, two players involved in everyday situations such as 
meeting each other for lunch, will not engage in an endless exchange of confirmations, and do 
not need strict rules or institutions telling them how to communicate.
4 
                                                 
3 Skyrms (2004) recently stresses the importance of stag hunt games for the analysis of collective action. On the 
importance of interactive knowledge in collective action problems, see Chant and Ernst (2008). 
4 A small literature investigates the robustness of Rubinstein’s results to modifications other than introducing 
multiple players. Dulleck (2007) shows that boundedly rational players with imperfect recall can still coordinate 
on requiring only a few messages. Dimitri (2004) shows that when messages from different players get lost with 
different  probabilities,  coordinate  action  can  still  occur,  as  the  player  whose  messages  arrive  with  high   3 
The purpose of the current paper is to investigate whether this intuition about voluntary 
communication without proofs of receipt extends to the multi-player electronic mail game.
5 
Let it be the case that most of the time, there is no benefit from collective action. When the 
opportunity for beneficial collective action arises, let an informed player find out about this 
and be able to send messages to other uninformed players. Let messages not get through with 
small probability, and let acting with less than the required number of players be risky. De 
Jaegher (2008b) investigates such a multi-player game with involuntary communication (i.e., 
an  automatic  communication  protocol),  and  shows  that  equilibria  exist  where  players  get 
locked into requiring a large number of proofs of receipt and proofs of proofs of receipt from 
one another. The question we here seek to answer is whether inefficiency is maintained in 
case of voluntary communication, where messages need not take the form of proofs of receipt. 
We show that, as such, a powerful mechanism is at work in the multi-player game that 
eliminates  the  most  inefficient  equilibria  of  the  game  with  involuntary  communication  as 
Nash equilibria of the game with voluntary communication. As communication is voluntary, 
each message sent by the individual player confirms that this player received every single 
required message so far, and thus sent all of his or her messages so far. Thus, player j does not 
necessarily need to receive multiple messages from player i; the last message received from 
player i suffices, as this shows that player i also sent all previous messages. It follows that 
cases where players reoccur on separate strings of confirmations are often eliminated. Also, 
such cases are further eliminated by application of sequential rationality and of the intuitive 
criterion, in arguments similar to those for the two-player EMG.  
Yet,  we  also  show  that  inefficient  Nash  equilibria  exist  that  survive  equilibrium 
refinements. To see why, suppose that the informed player informs each uninformed player 
separately, and then requires a confirmation from each uninformed payer; for N players, this 
means that  ) 1 ( 2 − N  messages must arrive for collective action to take place. Note that, in 
such an equilibrium, the informed player in this case does not run any risk from acting, and he 
or she knows with certainty that all other players are going to act. Each uninformed player, 
however, is never completely certain that any other player acts. All players are now better off 
in an efficient equilibrium where they send messages to one another ordered in a chain, where 
the last uninformed player in the chain sends a message to the informed player. This means 
that only N messages must arrive for collective action to take place. The informed player 
continues to know with certainty that all other players act; the uninformed player who is at 
position X in the line knows that  ) 1 ( − X  other players act.  
The reason that the inefficient equilibrium, where the informed player talks bilaterally to 
each uninformed player, cannot be eliminated is that a switch to the efficient equilibrium 
would require the informed player to stop sending messages to all but one uninformed player. 
But just as in the inefficient equilibrium, this uninformed player then receives a message from 
the informed player, and cannot observe that the informed player is trying to deviate to the 
efficient equilibrium. Concluding, the mechanisms that are at work in the two-player EMG to 
eliminate inefficiencies in a single string of confirmations, do not always work to eliminate 
inefficiencies across several strings of confirmations. We conclude that, while two players 
involved in a stag-hunt like collective action problem do not need hierarchies that tell them 
                                                                                                                                                          
probability can then be quite sure that his or her message arrived, and that it is the confirmation of the other 
player that got lost. Coles (2007) provides a similar result for the two-player EMG. Binmore and Samuelson 
(2001) investigate the effect of communication being voluntary instead of automatic. They show that, while 
efficient equilibria now exist, players may still coordinate on inefficient equilibria where a large number of 
messages are sent back and forth. 
5 A related multi-player stag hunt game is treated by Van Damme and Carlsson (1993). These authors treat the 
multi-player stag hunt in the context of equilibrium selection of the efficient, collective-action equilibrium rather 
than the inefficient equilibrium without action.     4 
when to confirm which message, multiple players do need such hierarchies. Intuitively, two is 
company, but three is a crowd. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 treats the multi-player EMG with voluntary 
communication by means of proofs of receipt (cf. Binmore and Samuelson, 2001). Section 3 
treats the multi-player EMG with voluntary communication by means of messages that can 
take on the meaning of confirmations of receipt in equilibrium (but can otherwise be sent even 
if no preceding message was received, cf. De Jaegher 2008a). We end with an interpretation 
in Section 4. 
 
 
2. Multi-player electronic mail game with voluntary communication consisting 




Our N-player electronic mail game takes the following form. There are two states of nature, 
state a and state b. State a occurs with probability  2 / 1 ) 1 ( > − p . The N players can choose 
from two actions, namely actions A and B. Taking action A yields payoff zero whatever the 
state of nature, and whatever the action of the other player. If players choose different actions, 
then those who choose action A obtain 0, and those who choose action B incur a loss of L. If 
all N players choose action B in state b, then each player obtains payoff M. If they all choose 
action B in state a, then each player incurs a loss of L. It is assumed that  0 > > M L .
6 In two-





  (0, 0) 
 
 
  (0, –L) 
 
  (0, 0) 
 
  (0, –L) 
 
  (–L, 0) 
 
 
  (–L, –L) 
 
 
  (–L, 0) 
 
  (M, M) 
 
 
Ga (probability (1–p) > ½)  Gb (probability p) 
 
Tabel 1. Two-player electronic mail game 
 
 
Only player 1 knows the state of nature. At stage 0, Nature decides whether the state is a or 
b,  and  player  1  observes  Nature’s  choice.  At  stage  1,  for  each  uninformed  player,  when 
having observed state b, player 1 decides whether or not to send an e-mail to him/her. For 
each e-mail sent, player 1 incurs a cost of d. 
                                                 
6  This  is  Morris  and  Shin’s  (1997)  version  of  the  electronic  mail  game  in  N-player  form.  It  differs  from 
Rubinstein’s (1989) original game in two aspects, both concerned with the game played in state a. First, in 
Rubinstein, each player obtains a payoff of M when all players play A in state a. Second, in Rubinstein, when all 
players play B in state a, each player obtains a payoff of zero. This version of the electronic mail game is also 
used in Morris (2002a, 2002b). 
A  A  B  B 
A  A 
B  B   5 
Simultaneously at stage 1, for each e-mail sent by player 1, Nature decides whether or not 
to  let  the  e-mail  arrive.  Each  e-mail  arrives  with  probability  ) 1 ( ε − ,  and  gets  lost  with 
probability ε. When having received an e-mail at stage 2, an uninformed player i can forward 
this e-mail to each of the  ) 1 ( − N  other players (which includes the informed player), where 
each sent e-mail again comes at a cost d. Again, Nature at stage 2 simultaneously decides 
whether or not to let each e-mail arrive, with the same probabilities as given above. At stage 
3, again at cost d, each e-mail that player j received at stage 2 (note that an uninformed player 
can receive up to  ) 2 ( − N  e-mails at stage 2; an informed player up to  ) 1 ( − N  e-mails) can be 
forwarded to the  ) 1 ( − N  other players. Nature again decides for each such e-mail whether or 
not to let it arrive. Etc. Players can forward e-mails up to stage z. The action decisions (A or 
B) are taken at stage  ) 1 ( + z . The payoffs are obtained at stage  ) 2 ( + z . 
By scrolling down a received e-mail, a player observes a sequence of players through which 
a message was forwarded. Thus, when player n receives a particular e-mail from player j at 
stage t, player n observes that player 1 sent an e-mail to player i, who forwarded this e-mail to 
player… j, who forwarded this e-mail to player k, who forwarded this e-mail to player l, who 
finally  forwarded  this  e-mail  to  player  n.  Each  e-mail  received  can  thus  be  seen  as  an 
observed message string of the form  n l k j i
x t x t x t x t x x , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1
... 1 → → → → → →
− − −
, where the numbers above 
the arrows refer to the stage at which an e-mail was sent, and x labels the message string. Note 
that  when  n  observes  n l k j i
x t x t x t x t x x , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1
... 1 → → → → → →
− − −
,  he/she  also  observes 
l k j i
x t x t x t x x , 1 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1
... 1
− − −
→ → → → → ,  k j i
x t x t x x , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1
... 1
− −
→ → → → ,  j i
x t x x , 3 , 2 , 1
... 1
−
→ → → ,  etc.  The  latter  message 
strings  are  called  sub  message  strings  of  n l k j i
x t x t x t x t x x , , 1 , 2 , 3 , 2 , 1
... 1 → → → → → →
− − −
.  The  short-hand 
notation for stating that message string mj,τ,x, received by player j at stage is a sub message 
string of message string mi,t,x received by player i at stage t is  x t i x j m m , , , , ⊂ τ ; x labels these 
message strings because a player may receive several message strings at one and the same 
stage. 
An action strategy  () .
1 + z
i e  for player i is a mapping from an event, namely an observed set of 
strings of messages received and not received, to the set (A, B). As an event, consisting of a 
number of messages received and a number of messages not received, is fully characterized 
by the messages received, we only write down the messages received to characterize an event 
(meaning  that  all  message  strings  not  denoted  are  then  not  received).  E.g., 
{ } ( ) B m m e y s i x t i
z
i = ∧ ∧
+ .... , , , ,
1   means  that  observance  of  a  set  of  message  strings 
{ } .... , , , , ∧ ∧ y s i x t i m m  leads to the playing of B by player i. 
Given a message string  k j i
x t x t x x , 1 , 2 , 2 , 1
... 1
− −
→ → → →  received by player k, a signaling strategy for 
player k is a mapping from an event, namely an observed set of strings of messages received 
and not received, to the set (0, 1) denoting whether or not player k forwards message string 
k j i
x t x t x x , 1 , 2 , 2 , 1
... 1
− −
→ → → →   to  player  l.    E.g.,  { } ( ) 1 .... , , , ,
... 1
, , 1 , 2 , 2 , 1 = ∧ ∧
→ → → → →
− − s z k t y k
l k j i
m m s x t x t x t x x   means  that 
player k forwards message string  k j i
x t x t x x , 1 , 2 , 2 , 1
... 1
− −
→ → → →  to player l whenever having previously 
observed message strings mk,y,t, mk,z,s, … The inverse mapping  ( ) {}{},... . , . 1
1
... 1
, , 1 , 2 , 2 , 1 →
−
→ → → → →
− −
l k j i
x t x t x t x x s  
gives a list of all events (received message strings) for which player k forwards message string 
k j i
x t x t x x , 1 , 2 , 2 , 1
... 1
− −
→ → → →  to player l.   6 
We consider only candidate equilibria for which it is the case that only a single set of 
message strings { } ... , , , , ∧ ∧ s y i t x i m m  leads player i to play B, where each message string in this 
set is then crucial for player i playing B. 
 
Definition 1 
Define as an equilibrium with crucial message strings a Nash equilibrium with the following 
features: 
(i)  the equilibrium can be described as a set M of sets of message strings Mi, where Mi = 
{ } ,... , , , , , s y i t x i m m , with one such set for each player i. A typical message  t x i m , ,  in the set Mi 
takes the form  i l k j
t t
→ → → → →
−1 2 1
... 1 . 
(ii) For each individual player i, as soon as he/she does not receive one of the message strings 
,... , , , , , s y i t x i m m , he/she does not act. Put otherwise, each player i only acts when receiving 
every message string in the set { } ,... , , , , , s y i t x i m m .  
 
In  De  Jaegher  (2008b),  equilibria  are  also  described  where  players  consider  several 
alternative sets of message strings as sufficient for doing B. The existence of such equilibria is 
logical when communication is assumed to be involuntary and costless. If communication is 
voluntary  and  costly,  however,  players  may  not  be  willing  to  incur  the  costs  of  sending 
multiple messages if a few messages suffices most of the time to induce the other players to 
act. For this reason, we here focus on equilibria with crucial messages. 




In an equilibrium where all message strings are crucial, define as a final node message string 
any message string  M m t x i ∈ , ,  such that  s x j t x i s x j m m M m , , , , , , : ⊂ ∈ ∃ / . Define MF as the set of 
all final node message strings in M. 
 
 
2.2 Nash equilibria 
 
We now come to a first proposition that identifies all candidate equilibrium networks as 
“trees” with three properties. A first property is that each uninformed player must occur at 
least once in the tree; this follows naturally from the assumption that all players are required 
to act, and therefore to be informed, for benefits to arise. A second property is that individual 
final node message strings in a tree need not run all the way to stage z. With involuntary 
communication, if all e-mails are automatically sent, then players always require information 
that a crucial e-mail has arrived, causing all strings of crucial messages to run to stage z. This 
is  the  case  both  in  the  two-player  electronic  mail  game  with  involuntary  communication 
(Rubinstein,  1989),  and  in  the  multi-player  electronic  mail  game  with  involuntary 
communication (De Jaegher, 2008b). Simply, if confirmations are available, players require 
them. Yet, with voluntary communication, if nobody sends a confirmation, then the potential 
recipients do not let their decision whether or not to act depend on the receipt of such a 
confirmation;  in  turn,  the  senders  do  not  send  the  confirmations.  Thus,  players’  mutual 
expectations can lead them to keep communication shorter. A third property is that a player i 
who  requires  a  message  string  x t i m , ,   in  equilibrium,  for  any  message  string  x j m , ,τ   with 
x t i x j m m , , , , ⊂ τ , will not require a message  y i m ), 1 ( , + τ  such that  y i x j m m ), 1 ( , , , + ⊂ τ τ . Graphically,   7 
this means that for any final node message string in an equilibrium tree, if a single message 
confirms receipt of a sub message string of this final node, this message can only be sent at 




Assume that an equilibrium exists that is described by a set of crucial messages M. Let MF be 
the subset of M that consists of all final nodes in M. Denote by  ) ( F M M −  the set of all 
messages in M that are not final nodes. Then 
(i)  Each uninformed player must occur at least once in M; 
(ii)  M m m m M m x j x t i x j F x t i ∈ ⊂ ∀ ∈ ∀ , , , , , , , , : : τ τ ; 
(iii) F x j F x t i M m M M m ∈ ∃ − ∈ ∀ , , , , ! : ) ( τ  such that  x j x t i m m , , , , τ ⊂ ; 
(iv)  F
t
x t i M j i m ∈ → = ∀ ... , , :  z t ≤ ; 
(v)  : : , , , , , , x t i x j F x t i m m M m ⊂ ∀ ∈ ∀ τ   y i m ), 1 ( , + ∀ τ  with  y i x j m m ), 1 ( , , , + ⊂ τ τ :  F y i M m ∉ + ), 1 ( , τ . 
Proof: 
(i) This is the consequence of the assumption that all players must act, and thus must be 
informed, for the collaborative payoff to be achieved. 
(ii) Suppose that a message string  F x t i M m ∈ , ,  takes the form  i l k j
x t x t x t x , , 1 , 2 , 1
... 1 → → → →
− −
. Then it is 
easy to see that  l
x t x t x
M l k j ∈ → → →
− − , 1 , 2 , 1
... 1 ,  k
x t x
M k j ∈ → →
− , 2 , 1
... 1 ,  j
x
M j∈ →... 1
, 1
. Simply, if a final 
node message string is crucial to player i, then a player, who does not receive a message string 
that is a sub message string of this final node message string, knows that player i does not act, 
and will not act him- or herself. 
(iii) Each message string mi,t,x in  ) ( F M M −  must be a sub message string of at least one 
message in MF. If this would not be the case, then either the message mi,t,x itself would be a 
final node (a contradiction); or would be a sub message string of a crucial final node message 
string not in MF (but this contradicts the definition of MF). 
(iv) Let no player require a proof of message string  j i
x t x t , , 1
... → →
−
. Given that sending an e-mail 
is costly, j does not send a proof of this message string then. Given that such a proof is never 
received, it is a best response for other players not to let their decision on whether or not to 
play B depend on whether they receive such a proof from player j. This in turn justifies player 
j’s strategy of not sending a proof. 
(v)  If  player  i  receives  message  string  x t i m , , ,  then  player  i  knows  that  player  j  received 
message string  x j m , ,τ , and does not need a confirmation  y i m ), 1 ( , + τ  of this to play B. It follows 
that message string  y i m ), 1 ( , + τ  cannot be crucial if message string  x t i m , ,  is crucial. 
QED 
 
An example of a tree that is eliminated by Proposition 1 is given in the left part of Figure 1. 
If Bob requires a message from Carl that Carl heard from Alice, then Bob does not need to 
hear from Alice directly. Similarly, Alice need not hear directly from Carl that he found out 
her information, if Alice already finds this out through Bob. The messages crossed through 
are thus eliminated (where it should be noted that one can make an opposite exercise where 
the crossed through messages are maintained, at the cost of all other messages except the 
message at stage 1 from Alice to Carl). The right part of Figure 1 presents a tree that is not   8 
eliminated by Proposition 1 as an equilibrium. This is because further confirmations are now 





Figure 1. Tree eliminated by Proposition 1 (left), and tree not eliminated by Proposition 1 
(right). 
 
Nevertheless, as we will now go on to show, the right part of Figure 1 is still eliminated as 
an equilibrium, and Proposition 1 does not describe all aspects of Nash equilibria. A first step 
to realizing this is to see that in the multi-player EMG with voluntary communication, in any 
equilibrium with crucial messages, when sending an e-mail a player does not only confirm 
receipt of a string of messages, but confirms receipt of every message he or she has received 
so far. In the right part of Figure 1, if a Nash equilibrium would correspond to this tree (which 
we will show is not the case), then Bob only sends a message at stage 3 when having received 
a message at stage 1, and Alice only sends messages at stage 4 when having received all 
messages at stage 2. If earlier messages are crucial to a player, then the player plays A as soon 
as not receiving any of those messages; given that A always yields payoff zero, the player then 




In equilibrium, let player i send an e-mail at stage t. Then player i only sends this e-mail when 
having received each message  t M m i x i < ∈ τ τ : , , . 
Proof: 
By definition, each message in Mi is a crucial message, in the sense that when player i does 
not receive it, he/she plays A. But playing A yields a zero payoff with certainty. It follows 
that, as soon as a player does not receive a crucial message, she does not send any further 
messages, as sending messages is costly. 
QED 
 





In a set of crucial message strings M, consider all parts of these messages strings from stage s 
to stage t. Then we say that a path exists from player a to player i between stage s and stage t  
                                                 
7 For readers familiar with the network literature, it should be stressed that our concept of a path differs from the 
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if an order of (sub) message strings  i h h g d c c b b a
y x w v u , ... , ... , ... , ... , ...
, ,..., , ,
ω ς τ σ ρ
→ → → → → → → → → →  exists in 
M,  where  i a,...,   refer  to  players,  where  y u,...,   refers  to  message  strings,  and  where 
ω ς τ σ ρ , , , ,  denote stages. The message strings  y u,...,  may or may not be different. It is the 
case that  ω ς τ σ ρ < < < < . 
 
 
Figure 2. Paths, and tree eliminated by Proposition 3. 
 
 
In Figure 2, which is the right-part of Figure 1, the following paths exist. Note first that all 
message strings are also paths. The most interesting paths are those that jump across message 
strings, where such jumps are indicated by ovals. In Figure 2, these are Alice ￿ Bob, Bob ￿ 
Alice, Alice ￿ Bob; Alice ￿ Bob, Bob ￿ Alice, Alice ￿ Carl; Alice ￿ Carl ￿ Alice, Alice 
￿  Bob;  and  Alice  ￿  Carl  ￿  Alice,  Alice  ￿  Carl.  We  now  provide  a  result  about  the 
information that a player receives when getting a message in a path. 
 
Lemma  1.  Across  message  strings  in  an  equilibrium  with  crucial  messages,  let  a  path 
i h h g d c c b b a
y x w v u , ... , ... , ... , ... ,
, ,..., , ,
ω ς τ σ ρ
→ → → → → → → → →   exist  from  player  a  to  player  i.  Then,  when 
receiving an e-mail from player h at stage ω in message string y, player i knows that player b 
observed message string  b a
u , ρ
→ , player c observed message string  c b
v , ... σ
→ → , player d observed 
message string  d c
w , ... τ
→ → , etc. 
 
In the example of Figure 2, e.g. when Bob receives an e-mail from Alice at stage 4, he 
knows that Alice received an e-mail from Carl at stage 2. We now define as a message set all 
the message strings that a player knows to have been realized when receiving an e-mail in an 
equilibrium with crucial messages. 
 
Definition 4. Consider message string  i h
y t y t , ), 1 (
... → →
−
, and consider all paths from stage 1 to 
stage  ) 1 ( − t  between players 1 and h. Then by Lemma 1, in any equilibrium with crucial 
messages, when player i receives message string   i h
y t y t , ), 1 (
... → →
−
, player i knows the information 
contained in all the message strings which are part of a path from stage 1 to stage  ) 1 ( − t  
between players 1 and h. We refer to this information, which takes the form of a set of 
messages, as player i’s message set when receiving message  i h
y t y t , ), 1 (
... → →
−
 in an equilibrium 
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In Figure 2, when Bob or Carl receive an e-mail from Alice at stage 4, their individual 
message sets contain all messages in the tree except the message sent by Bob to Carl at stage 
2, and the message sent by Alice to Bob at stage 3. While message sets can span different 
message strings, they in fact have similar properties to message strings. Just like message 
strings, message sets can be seen as a chain of messages starting at stage 1 (this is because 
paths can always be made to start at stage 1 – see above). Also, just as message strings, 




→ →  be an element in player i’s 
message set  y t i , , µ when receiving message  i h
y t y t , ), 1 (
... → →
−
. Denote by  l, ,u σ µ  player l’s message 




→ → . Then all messages in  l, ,u σ µ  are elements of  y t i , , µ .  l, ,u σ µ  
can thus be seen as a sub message set of message set  y t i , , µ . 
Finally, just as a message string can only materialize if all of its sub message strings are 
realized, so is the realization of a message set only possible when all of its sub message sets 
have  been  realized.  To  see  why,  consider  one  path 
i h h g d c c b b a
y x w v u , ... , ... , ... , ... ,
, ,..., , ,
ω ς τ σ ρ
→ → → → → → → → → . If b does not receive a message from a at stage 
ρ, player b does not send a message at stage σ, player c does not send a message at stage τ,…, 
player g does not send a message to player h (and h will not send a message to i). The same 
applies wherever you start in a path. Moreover, the same applies for any path arriving at i at 
stage t. Summarising: 
 
Lemma 2. Consider a message  i h
y , ... ω
→ → . If any message contained in i’s message set  y i , ,ω µ  
accumulated in message  i h
y , ... ω
→ →  is not received, then i will not send any confirmations of 
message string   i h
y , ... ω
→ →  in an equilibrium with crucial message strings. 
 
In the example of Figure 2, consider the message set that contains all the messages in the 
tree except the message sent by Bob to Carl at stage 2, and the message sent by Alice to Bob 
at stage 3. Then, if any message in this message set gets lost, Bob and Carl do not receive a 




Proposition 3.  
Let an equilibrium tree contain a crucial message  i h
y , ... ω
→ → . Consider the message set  y i , ,ω µ  
about which player i is informed when receiving this message in an equilibrium. Then for any 
message  b a
u , ... σ
→ →  in  y i , ,ω µ , we have 
1 ... ,u ,u
F a b i M
σ σ +
→ → → ∉ . 
Proof: 
By Lemma 1, message string  i h
y , ... ω
→ →  already contains the information that message  b a
u , ... σ
→ →  
was  received.  It  follows  that  if  message  string  i h
y , ... ω
→ →   is  crucial,  message  string 
i b a
u u , 1 , ... +
→ → →
σ σ
 cannot be crucial. QED 
 
In the example of Figure 2, if the equilibrium tree involves the e-mails sent by Alice to Bob 
and Carl at stage 4, then it cannot contain the e-mails that are crossed out. Note that after   11 
these messages are deleted, further messages need to be deleted in order to keep the e-mails 
sent by Alice to Bob and Carl at stage 4 as crucial messages. This generalizes the principle in 
the left part of Figure 1. There, if players consider a message string as crucial, they cannot 
consider final node confirmations of sub message strings of this message string as crucial. In 
Figure  2,  if  players  consider  a  message  set  as  crucial,  they  cannot  consider  final  node 
confirmations of sub message sets of this message set as crucial. 
In order to have an idea of both the strength and the limits of the principle expanded in 
Proposition 3 for eliminating inefficient equilibria, we provide an additional result. 
 
Corollary 1. In the multi-player EMG with voluntary communication by means of proofs of 
receipt,  equilibria  with  crucial  messages  cannot  contain  more  than  ) 1 ( − N N   final  node 
message strings. 
Proof: It can be checked that any tree with more than  ) 1 ( − N N  final node messages violates 
Proposition 3. QED 
 
In comparison to the result in Corollary 1, in the largest possible communication network, 
z N ) 1 ( −  messages are sent at stage z. An example of an equilibrium tree with a maximal 
number of final node message strings for the three-player EMG with proofs of receipt is given 
in Figure 3. The final node message strings end in all possible e-mails that the three players 
can send to one another. Note that, when Carl receives an e-mail from Bob at stage 3, Carl 
also knows that Bob sent an e-mail to him at stage 2. Yet, the e-mail at stage 2 continues to be 
crucial because Alice and Bob require a confirmation of it. It follows that Carl still considers 
the e-mail from Bob at stage 2 crucial, since otherwise Carl cannot send a proof of receipt to 
Alice  and  Bob.  For  this  reason,  equilibrium  trees  where  a  lot  of  messages  are  required 





Figure 3. Equilibrium tree with maximal amount of final node message strings in multi-player 
EMG with proofs of receipt. 
 
 
We have so far shown what form Nash equilibrium trees with crucial message strings (in 
the multi-player EMG with proofs of receipt) take if they do exist. It remains to be shown that 
the trees with the properties derived in Propositions 1 and 3 are indeed Nash equilibria. We 
separately check whether the players’ action strategies are best responses, given that they 
have followed the equilibrium signaling strategies (Proposition 4). Next, we check whether 
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Proposition 4. 
Consider any set of crucial message strings M with the properties derived in Proposition 1 and 
Proposition 3. Consider an individual player i. For a tree as characterized in Propositions 1 
and 3, let all other players than i only play B when receiving all their e-mails in this tree, and 
only send a proof of receipt when having received all e-mails in the tree so far. Then: 
(i)  if player i does not receive a message string of which player i’s proof of receipt is 
crucial to at least one other player, then player i plays A; 
(ii)  if player i does not receive a crucial final node message string, then player i plays A; 
(iii)  small levels of ε with  [ [ C ε ε , 0 ∈  exist such that player i prefers to play B when player i 
receives all crucial messages.  C ε , the critical value of ε such that some player receiving 
a message string in M is indifferent between playing A and B, is a function of z. 
Proof: 
(i)  By definition, if player i does not receive a message string, she cannot send a proof of 
receipt of this message string. If such a proof of receipt is crucial to another player, then 
this other player will play A. Given that player i incurs a loss as soon as one other player 
plays A, he/she plays A. 
(ii)  By Corollary 1, if player i does not receive a final node crucial message string from 
player h, he/she does not receive any other message containing the same information. At 
best, player i knows that a message was sent to player h. Player i’s expected utility from 











. Since L > M, this is smaller than the 
payoff zero when playing A. As player i plays A even under these best circumstances, 
she always plays A when she does not receive a final crucial message. 
(iii)  In  any  candidate  equilibrium,  given  that  all  other  players  follow  the  candidate 
equilibrium strategy, a player who has received all crucial messages faces uncertainty 
whether X other crucial messages arrive. Each such player therefore faces a decision of 
weighing  [ ]L M
X X ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ε ε − − − −  against zero. For any X, a small ε can be found 
such that the player prefers to play B. 
QED 
 
Intuitively,  the potential  receiver  of  a  non-final  node  message  string plays A  when not 
receiving  this  message  string,  as  this  automatically blocks at  least  one  other player  from 
receiving a crucial proof of receipt. The potential receiver of a final node message string, 
when not receiving this message string, plays A because of the large loss of playing B when 
not all other players are playing B. 
 
Proposition 5. 
By Proposition 4 a level of ε denoted as  C ε  exists such that for each ε with  [ [ C ε ε , 0 ∈ , each 
player in any tree characterized by a set of crucial message strings M that has the properties 
derived in Propositions 1 and 3, strictly prefers to play B when having received all crucial 
message strings in M. Given such an  C ε , levels of d with  [ [ ) ( , 0 C d d ε ∈  exist such that each 
receiver of a non-final node message string in M strictly prefers to send the proof of receipt 
implied by M when having received all messages so far in M. 
Proof: 
The general form of the expected payoff to a player of sending any candidate equilibrium 
message, given that all other players follow the candidate equilibrium, can be derived in the 
following way. Assume that, when a player sends a current message, this implies that the   13 
player will also send all further messages, if the opportunity presents itself. By Proposition 4, 
the player will only consider doing B when having been able to send all further messages in 
M. Let X1, X2, X3,…, XF messages need to arrive for the player to send his or her first, second, 
third,… final message after having sent the current message. The player’s expected payoff 
when sending the current message then takes a nested form: 
 
  ( ) [ ] { } d d d
X X X − − − − − − ) (... ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
3 2 1 ε ε ε   (1) 
 
where the player’s decision to send the final message takes the form  
 
  [ ] d L M
F F X X − − − − − ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( ε ε ,  (2) 
 
and is contained into the latter expression. It is easy to see that if the player is willing to send 
the earliest message (along with all future ones (see (1)), he also will want to send all future 
messages. For  0 = d  , given that  [ [ C ε ε , 0 ∈ , (2) is larger than zero. Moreover (1) is larger 
than zero as well. It follows that levels  [ [ ) ( , 0 C d d ε ∈  exist such that all expressions such as 




2.3 Efficient equilibria 
 
Having characterized the equilibria with crucial message strings of the multi-player EMG 
with  proofs  of  receipt,  we  now  investigate  what  are  the  efficient  equilibria.  In  order  to 
disentangle the effect of the fact that the e-mails are costly, and of the fact that they are noisy, 
we  first  treat  efficiency  separately  for  a  model  with  costly,  noiseless  e-mails,  and  with 
costless,  noisy  e-mails.  In  the  model  with  costly,  noiseless  messages,  all  trees  that  have 
) 1 ( − N  messages are efficient. In the model with costless, noisy messages, lines with  ) 1 ( − N  
messages are efficient and best to the last uninformed player receiving a message; lines with 
N messages, where the informed player receives a final message, are also efficient and are 
best to the informed player. 
 
Proposition 6. In the absence of noise, any tree starting at the informed player with exactly 
one message sent to each of the ) 1 ( − N  uninformed players is Pareto-efficient. 
Proof:   
Players are certain that all messages arrive, and therefore, compared to trees with  ) 1 ( − N  
messages,  cannot become better  off  if  confirmations  are  added  to  these  trees.  Given that 
messages are costly, some players would become worse off without anyone getting better off.   
 
Thus, many Pareto-efficient trees exist for the game without noise, and players differ on 
their preferences over these trees depending on the message sending costs they incur. In the 
absence of noise, there only is a conflict over who bears the cost of sending messages. In a 
star, the informed player bears all the message sending costs. In a line, each player except the 
last player in line sends one message. There are many other Pareto-efficient trees between 
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Proposition 7. Consider equilibria where each message is crucial. Let sending messages be 
costless, but let there be noise. Then the Pareto-efficient trees are any line of size  ) 1 ( − N , and 
any line of size N where the informed player receives at most one confirmation of earlier 
messages (anywhere between stage 2 and the final stage). 
Proof: 
The proof consists of three parts. In (i), we first show that no more than one final message can 
be situated at a stage before the final stage at which any message is sent. In (ii) we show that 
only one message can be sent at the final stage. In (iii), we show that uninformed players can 
only occur once in each message tree, whereas the informed player can occur twice. 
(i)  Consider a tree g in which stage t is the last stage with any final node message string, 
and let more than one message string be crucial at stage s, with s < t. Thus, we have a 
final  node  message  string  mx  ending  at  t,  j i h g f r q m
t t s
→ → → → → →
− + 1 1
... ... ... 1
τ τ
. 
Additionally, we have a message  l k
s
→ , with  g l ≠ , part of message string my. Denote 




,  with  s ≤ τ   the  earliest  message  string  contained  in  my  but  not  in  mx. 









 of  n m g → , with  τ σ ≥ . Construct now a 
new  tree  j i h g f r p o n q m
t t s ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 1 ( 2 1 1
... ... ... ... 1
− − + − − + − − − + + + +
→ → → → → → → →
τ σ τ σ τ σ σ σ τ τ
.  This  is  done 
by taking the tree  n m g →  out of the old tree, and reconnecting it, where player q at stage 
(τ + 1) sends a message to player n (and continues to send all other messages he/she sent 
in the old network); where all confirmations are further sent as in  n m g →  (and thus now 
also confirm that q received a message from m at τ); and where p, when receiving a 
message from o, sends a confirmation at  ) 2 ( + σ  to r. Then all players up to stage τ have 
the same information as before. All players after τ have at least as much information. It 
follows that all players are better off in the newly constructed network. An example is in 
Figure 4. By repeating this procedure any number of times, one eventually obtains a tree 
in which not more than one message is sent at a non-final stage. 
(ii)  Consider two players i and j receiving a final node message string at the same stage t. 
By (i), this needs to be from one and the same player. Construct a new tree where j no 
longer receives such a message, but where i at stage  ) 1 ( + t  sends a confirmation of all 
messages received before to j. Then i is equally well off, but j is better off. 
(iii)  Consider all candidate efficient trees, which by (i) and (ii) must be lines. Let a player i 
occur more than one time in such a line. The first time, let him receive a message from 
player h, and let him send a message to j. Construct a new tree where h confirms directly 
to  j,  without  passing  by  i,  and  where  everything  otherwise  stays  the  same.  Then 
everyone  is  better  off  because  less  messages  are  sent  over  all,  but  players  are  still 
ordered in the same way according to their uncertainty. 
QED 
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Figure 4. Example of part (i) of the proof of Prop. 7, where 1 = k = f = m, s = τ, 3 = g = q, 2 = 
n, 4 = r. 
 
Finally, we provide a result for the combination of noise and costly signals, based on the 
assumption that signaling costs are relatively small. 
 
Proposition  8.  Consider  equilibria  with  crucial  messages  in  the  multi-player  EMG  with 
proofs of receipt. Let there be noise, and let sending messages be costly. Then relatively small 
ranges of d exist such that the efficient equilibrium trees are any tree of size  ) 1 ( − N , and any 
tree  of  size  N  where  the  informed  player  receives  at  most  one  confirmation  of  earlier 
messages (anywhere between stage 2 and the final stage), with a common characteristic. The 
common characteristic in these trees is that multiple messages can only be sent at the unique 
final node stage. 
Proof: 
We follow the same structure as in the proof of Proposition 7, and check the extent to which 
the arguments set out there continue to apply with costly signals. 
(i)  Consider the procedure in part (i) of the proof of Proposition 7 for constructing a new 
tree from an inefficient tree. With costly signals, it continues to be the case that all 
players up to stage τ have the same information as before; also, they have the same 
signaling costs as before. All players after τ have at least as much information, and with 
the  exception  of  player  p,  carry  the  same  signaling  costs.  As  player  p  has  more 
information, for small signaling costs, she will be better off by sending a message in the 
newly constructed tree. It follows that all players are better off in the newly constructed 
tree. 
(ii)  Consider two players i and j receiving a final node message string at the same stage 
(from one and the same player). Construct a new tree where j no longer receives such a 
message, but where i at stage  ) 1 ( + t  sends a confirmation of all messages received 
before to j. Then i is worse off, but j is better off. Therefore, there is no Pareto-superior 
move from networks with several final node messages sent at the same stage. 
(iii)  The argument set out in (iii) of Proposition 7 is reinforced because j additionally saves 




By Proposition 8, the structure of all efficient equilibrium trees takes the form of a line, a star, 
or a combination of a line and a star. The last player in the line sends a message to each 
remaining player. Examples of such networks for the four-player case are given in Figure 5, 
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Figure 5. Efficient trees in the four-player EMG. 
 
 
2.4 Equilibrium selection 
 
We end this section by noting that equilibrium refinements have no cutting ground in the 
EMG with proofs of receipt. Eliminating some Nash equilibria is driven by players’ responses 
in equilibrium to out-of-equilibrium events. Nash equilibria may not be sequential equilibria 
because  players’  best  response  to  an  out-of-equilibrium  event  cannot  possibly  be  a  best 
response  as  soon  as  this  out-of-equilibrium  event  occurs  with  positive  probability.  Yet, 
because of noise, the event of not receiving a message already occurs in equilibrium with 
positive probability, limiting the available out-of-equilibrium events. Furthermore, because 
players can only send proofs of receipt, the only out-of-equilibrium messages that can be sent 
are extra proofs of receipt, thus extending rather than limiting the number of messages. For 
this reason, out-of-equilibrium messages cannot have the function of indicating a player’s 
willingness to move to a Pareto-superior equilibrium. Equilibrium selection arguments can be 
at  work,  however,  if  players’  messages  are  not  literally  proofs  of  receipt.  This  case  is 
investigated in the next section. 
 
 
3.  Multi-player  electronic  mail  game  with  voluntary  communication:  false 
acknowledgements can be sent 
 
We now assume that messages are not literally proofs of receipt, and can only take on the 
meaning of confirmations of receipt in equilibrium. We assume each player to have a set of 
messages at his or her disposition. In equilibrium, a particular message sent at a particular 
time takes on the meaning of a particular message string. Note that the sender of such a 
message can then pretend to have observed a message string even when this is not true. While 
this extends the strategy space, Nash equilibria replicating the equilibria with proofs of receipt 
may continue to exist. In such replicating equilibria, while it is possible to tell other players 
that  one  has  received  a  message  string  even  if  this  is  not  true  (referred  to  as  a  false 
acknowledgement), players find it a best response to be honest. This section investigates the 
1 
1  2  1 
3 
4 
1  1  2  3  4  1  1  2  3  4  1  1  2  3  4 
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extent to which such replicating equilibria continue to be Nash equilibria (Section 3.1), and 
whether  any  replicating  equilibria  survive  standard  refinements  of  the  Nash  equilibrium 
(sequential equilibrium, Section 3.2; intuitive criterion, Section 3.3). 
 
 





Figure 6. Non-Nash tree in the three-player EMG without proofs of receipt. 
 
 
Figure 6 repeats Figure 3, and indicates two paths. In the EMG with proofs of receipt, the 
presence of these paths is irrelevant. Even though e.g. Carl, when receiving an e-mail from 
Bob at stage 3, knows that Bob sent an e-mail to him at stage 2, Carl still requires the e-mail 
at stage 2 as well, as Alice and Bob require a proof of receipt of it. Yet, in the EMG without 
proofs of receipt (i.e. with the possibility of false acknowledgements), when Carl does not 
receive an e-mail from Bob at stage 2, Carl can pretend to Alice and Bob that he received an 
e-mail from Bob. Carl does not know whether there is an opportunity for collective action at 
this point, but reasons that he may yet receive an e-mail from Bob at stage 3, indicating that 
Bob’s  message  at  stage  2  got  lost. Carl  thereby  still  gets  an  opportunity  to  benefit  from 
collective action even though a message got lost. As long as the cost of sending a message is 
not too high (it is still probable that there is no opportunity for collective action), Carl may 
still turn out to play B even when not receiving an e-mail from Bob at stage 2. But if this is so, 
then the tree in Figure 6 is not a Nash equilibrium with crucial messages. In general, if players 
consider a message set as crucial in the multi-player EMG without proofs of receipt, they 
cannot consider any confirmations of sub message sets of this message set as crucial. Note 
that this is more general than the final node confirmations of Proposition 3. 
 
 
Proposition 9. Consider a candidate equilibrium of the multi-player EMG without proofs of 
receipt replicating any of the equilibria derived for the case with proofs of receipt. Consider 
player i’s decision to send one ore more false acknowledgements at stage  ) 1 ( + t , after not 
having  received  message  string 
, ... t x
h i → →   from h  at t, but  having  received  all  equilibrium 
messages at or before t. Consider all messages contained in  x t i , , µ in this case. Suppose (i) that 
there is a path from each of these messages to player i at stage t or later. Then, for sufficiently 
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In a candidate equilibrium replicating an equilibrium of the multi-player EMG with proofs 
of receipt, let player i not receive message string  i h
x t, ...
→ →  (but receive all other messages). Let 
player i  send  one  or  more  false  acknowledgements, pretending  to  have  received  message 
string  x t i , , µ .  By  (i),  it  is  still  possible  that  player  i  receives  information  later  on  that  all 
message strings contained in  x t i , , µ  except  i h
x t, ...
→ →  were received. If player i does not receive 
this information, by Proposition 4, player i plays A. If player i does receive this information, 
then player i plays B for the same reason that he/she plays B when  i h
x t, ...
→ →  is received and the 
candidate equilibrium is followed. It follows that player i’s expected payoff net of signaling 
costs of sending one or more false acknowledgements is positive. Therefore, for sufficiently 
small d, player i sends these, and the candidate equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium. 
QED 
 
An application of Proposition 9 is that, as soon as a player i requires a message string from 
player j at stage t on string mi,t,x, player i cannot require in equilibrium any messages of other 
message strings that have mj,(t-1),x as a sub message string. This is summarized in Corollary 2. 
 
Corollary 2. In an equilibrium tree of the multi-player EMG without proofs of receipt, let 
player i require mi,t,x. Then  x i x t i x t j m m m , , , , ), 1 ( , : τ ∀ ⊂ ∀ −  with  M m m m x i x i x t j ∉ ⊂ − , , , , ), 1 ( , : τ τ . 
 
As an example of the relevance of Corollary 2 consider the three-player game. If Alice 
sends a message to Bob and Carl at stage 1, then Bob’s message cannot (directly or indirectly) 
be forwarded to Carl, and vice versa. Thus, we have one message string on which only Alice 
and Bob can be positioned, and one message string on which only Alice and Carl can be 
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Figure 8 Nash tree that is not sequentially rational. 
 
 
Contrary to what is the case in the game with proofs of receipt, in the game without proofs 
of receipt, out-of-equilibrium events can be generated by the fact that false acknowledgements 
can be sent. As we now show, this causes some paths that exist across Nash equilibrium trees 
to be eliminated for not being sequentially rational. Consider Figure 8. Let Carl not receive 
the e-mail from Bob at stage 3, but let Carl still send a false acknowledgement to Bob at stage 
4.  If  Bob  did  not  receive  the  e-mail  at  stage  2,  then  Bob  finds  out  that  Carl’s 
acknowledgement is false. Bob could then punish Carl by playing A and not sending an e-
mail. Yet, such a punishment does not keep Carl from sending a false acknowledgement: if 
Carl receives an e-mail from Bob at stage 5, Carl then knows that Bob did not detect the false 
acknowledgement, and can safely play B; if Carl does not receive an e-mail, Carl knows that 
it is likely that his false acknowledgement was detected, and does not run any risk by playing 
A.  Therefore,  this  kind  of  punishment  does  not  stop  Carl  from  sending  a  false 
acknowledgement as long as the cost of sending a message is relatively low. A punishment 
that does stop Carl from sending a false acknowledgement is when Bob sends an e-mail at 
stage 5 even after having detected a false acknowledgement, and even though he is planning 
to do A. But such a punishment is not sequentially rational, as it is never a best response to 
send a costly message when one at the same time takes an action that always yields payoff 0. 
Note that the same principle is at work if Carl does not send a message directly to Bob, and 
next Bob does not send a message directly to Carl, but if there is instead a corresponding path 
between these players. The general result is stated in Proposition 10. 
   
Proposition 10. 
Consider a Nash equilibrium tree of the multi-player EMG without proofs of receipt. Then 
this tree is not a sequential equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) if, for any message 





(i)  there is a path in the tree from player i to player h between stage t and some stage (t + x), 
with x > 1; and 
(ii) there is a path in the tree from player h to player i starting at stage (t + x). 
Proof:  
Let all other players follow the Nash equilibrium, and let player i not receive message string 
i h
x t, ...
→ → .  If  the  last  e-mail  in  this  message  got  lost,  and  if  player  i  sent  a  false 
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Moreover, if player h does not send any messages when detecting a false acknowledgement, 
then a player i, who still receives a message from player h, knows that player h did not detect 
the false acknowledgement. At the same time, it is never a best response for player h to send a 
message and play A. Thus, when player i still receives a message from player h, player i 
knows  that  the  false  acknowledgement  went  undetected;  when  player  i  does  not  receive 
anymore messages from player h, player i avoids any risk by playing A. Net of signaling 
costs, the expected payoff of sending a false acknowledgement is therefore positive. It follows 
that for sufficiently small d, player i sends a false acknowledgement. The Nash equilibrium is 
supported  by  a  response  of  player  h  to  an  out-of-equilibrium  event  that  is  never  a  best 
response when the out-of-equilibrium event actually takes place. It follows that such a Nash 
equilibrium is not a sequential equilibrium. QED 
 
It should be noted that Proposition 10 generalizes a principle that is at work in the two-
player EMG without proofs of receipt (De Jaegher, 2008a) to the multi-player setting. In the 
two-player game, this principle eliminates any sequence of the form 1 ￿ 2 ￿ 1 ￿ 2. There, it 
is strictly a result about message strings. As pointed out above, in the multi-player game, 
message sets have the same function as message strings, and Proposition 10 eliminates orders 
of the type h ￿ i , i ￿ h , h ￿ i  in a message set (and thus in a path). 
 
 
3.3 Forward induction 
 
When  checking  whether  the  Nash  equilibria  described  in  Section  3.  1  are  sequential 
equilibria,  the  test  is  whether  punishments  of  out-of-equilibrium  messages  such  as  false 
acknowledgements are indeed a best response when this false acknowledgement is actually 
sent. We now check whether an out-of-equilibrium move such as a false acknowledgement 
can be interpreted as an attempt of a player to move to a Pareto superior equilibrium. After all, 
if player h detects an out-of-equilibrium message sent by player i, player h should wonder 
why such a costly message was sent, given that player i could have safely obtained payoff 
zero by not sending any further message and playing A. It is clear that player i only has the 
intention to send a costly message if he/she believes that collective action is still possible. 
Thus, rather than interpreting an out-of-equilibrium message as an attempt to cheat, one could 
argue  that  it  should  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  increase  the  probability  of  collective 
action. Yet, the question then is: how does the sender of an out-of-equilibrium message intend 
to coordinate on taking collective action (cf. Cho and Kreps, 1987)? 
For example, consider the inefficient Nash equilibrium tree for the four player EMG in the 
top left part of Figure 9. The probability of collective action is larger in the efficient Nash 
equilibria on the top right and bottom left parts of Figure 9. Yet, if Alice deviates by sending 
an e-mail straight to Bob, it is unclear whether the other players will be able to coordinate on 
either the top right or bottom left tree. For instance, Bob may tell Carl what he heard from 
Alice, expecting Carl to forward this message to David. But Carl may think that Bob already 
informed David directly, in which case collective action fails. 
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Figure 9 Inefficient and efficient Nash equilibria of the four-player EMG without proofs of 
receipt. 
 
Because of the problem illustrated by Figure 9, we propose to eliminate trees by means of 
forward induction only if an out-of-equilibrium message allows a move to a Pareto-superior 
tree, where everyone continues to send messages to the same players at the same stages as 
before, but where part of the messages from the old tree are no longer sent. This leads us to 
the following conjecture. 
 
Conjecture  1.  Consider  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  the  multi-player  EMG  without  proofs  of 





corresponding message set  t x i , , µ  for player i. Let the following conditions be valid: 
(i)  Consider player h’s message set  ) 1 ( , , − t x h µ . Before a stage τ with  t ≥ τ , there is a path from 
each message in  ) 1 ( , , − t x h µ  to player i. 
(ii) At a stage  τ σ ≥ , there is a path from player i to player h. 
Then, if player i receives all e-mails contained in M except the e-mail from h at stage t, player 
i  sends  all  other  e-mails  in M,  and player h  sends  all  messages  in M  and plays B when 
receiving all messages in M except the message at stage (t – 1). 
 
An application of this conjecture is represented in Figure 10. If Carl receives an e-mail from 
Eric but not from Bob, Carl sends a false acknowledgement to David, who confirms receipt of 
it to Bob. Even if Bob did not receive a message from Alice, Bob should still act. It is as if 
Carl were saying: “I don’t need to hear from you that you know about the opportunity for 
collective  action, because  I  already  know  this  information  through  Eric.  I  know  that  you 
require information about this opportunity, but since I am communicating it to you, I am 
confident that you will receive it.” 
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3.4 Remaining inefficient equilibria 
 
Figure 9 already illustrates one way in which players may not be able to move away from 
inefficient equilibria. A player may be included more than once in a message string. As the 
player, the last time he receives a message, finds out the same information plus additional 
information contained in the message string, he/she does not need this information the first 
time. Nevertheless, if other players require a confirmation that he/she has also received this 
early information, then in equilibrium the player will still require this early information before 
he/she acts. 
Another way in which players may get locked in inefficient equilibria is illustrated in Figure 
7. As already shown in Section 2.3, all players are better off if they communicate in a line 
Alice ￿ Bob ￿ Carl ￿ Alice. Yet, if Alice stops sending a message to Carl and only sends a 
message to Bob, then neither Bob nor Carl observe out-of-equilibrium events. Players may get 
locked into such an inefficient equilibrium whenever a player informs separate “cliques” of 





This paper shows that, contrary to what is the case in the two-player electronic mail game 
with  voluntary  communication,  players  of  the  multi-player  game  with  voluntary 
communication may get locked into playing inefficient equilibria where they require too large 
an amount of messages from each other, thus reducing the probability of collective action. 
The most efficient communication protocol for multiple players would be one in which each 
player receives only one message. While sequential rationality helps to rule out sequences for 
messages send back and forth between any pair of two players also in the multiple-player 
situation, it does not help to rule out inefficient communication where redundant messages 
and confirmations are sent to separate subgroups, or “cliques”, of players. At the same time, 
the intuitive criterion has little cutting ground, because of the many players involved. When 
an individual player sends an out-of-equilibrium message in an attempt to move to a Pareto-
superior equilibria, it is not clear which Pareto-superior equilibrium he wants to move to. 
From this perspective, an argument can be made for  what can broadly be described as 
institutionalized  communication  (for  an  overview,  see  Koessler,  2000).  In  a  first  type  of 
institutionalized  communication, players  can  take leadership  in  order  to  guide  all players 
towards  a  Pareto-efficient  outcome  (for  a  broad  perspective  on  leadership  in  resolving 
coordination problems, see Foss, 1999). For instance, in the four-player game, let players be 
Bob 
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stuck in the inefficient equilibrium on the top left of Figure 9. Alice could now take the lead 
and instruct Bob to instruct Carl to tell David that there is an opportunity for collective action, 
after which Bob indeed instructs Carl to tell David. Similarly, in Figure 7 Bob could take the 
lead and instruct Carl to confirm to Alice that both Bob and Carl know about the opportunity. 
It  should  be  noted  that  such  leadership  requires  a  richer  language  than  the  one  we  have 
assumed in the body of the paper, where players could only tell the string of players through 
which  a  message  was  forwarded.  In  a  second  type  of  institutionalized  communication, 
common knowledge gets generated by an  event such as a public meeting (Chwe, 2001). In 
the example of Figure 9, when Alice finds out about the opportunity for collective action, she 
calls a meeting of the four players. The fact that all players observe each other in this meeting 
creates  common  knowledge  of players’  intentions  to  act.  A  third type  of  institutionalized 
communication is guided by strict protocols of who can talk to whom, and of who needs to 
know what (Chwe, 1995). Thus, collective action is successful because a hierarchy exists 
among the agents involved in the collection-action problem. Interpreting firms as collectives 
that  (next  to  other  things)  need  to  solve  coordination  (collective-action)  problems,  this 
argument  would  seem  to  give  credit  to  the  so-called  classical  management’s  (e.g.  Fayol, 
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